Abstract: In this paper, we consider a linear quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game. Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. The existence of the former is characterized by the solvability of a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, and that of the latter is characterized by the solvability of a system of coupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. Sometimes, open-loop Nash equilibria admit a closed-loop representation, via the solution to a system of non-symmetric Riccati equations, which is different from the outcome of the closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. However, it is found that for the case of zero-sum differential games, the Riccati equation system for the closedloop representation of open-loop saddle points coincides with that for the closed-loop saddle points, which leads to the conclusion that the closed-loop representation of open-loop saddle points is the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop saddle point as long as both exist. In particular, for linear quadratic optimal control problem, the closed-loop representation of open-loop optimal controls coincides with the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy, provided both exist.
Introduction
Let (Ω, F , F, P) be a complete filtered probability space on which a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion {W (t), t 0} is defined such that F = {F t } t 0 is the natural filtration of W (·) augmented by all the P-null sets in F . Consider the following controlled linear (forward) stochastic differential equation ( In the above, X(·) is called the state process taking values in the n-dimensional Euclidean space R n with the initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n ; for i = 1, 2, u i (·) is called the control process of Player i taking values in R mi . We assume that the coefficients A(·), B 1 (·), B 2 (·), C(·), D 1 (·), and D 2 (·) are deterministic matrix-valued functions of proper dimensions, and that b(·) and σ(·) are F-progressively measurable processes taking values in R n . For i = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0, T ), we define where the superscript ⊤ denotes the transpose of matrices, and G i is a symmetric matrix; q i (·), ρ i 1 (·), and ρ i 2 (·) are allowed to be vector-valued F-progressively measurable processes, and g i is allowed to be an F T -measurable random vector. Then we can formally pose the following problem.
Problem (SDG).
For any initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and i = 1, 2, Player i wants to find a control u * i (·) ∈ U i [t, T ] such that the cost functional J i (t, x; u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is minimized.
The above posed problem is referred to as a linear quadratic (LQ, for short) stochastic two-person differential game. In the case (1.3) J 1 (t, x; u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) + J 2 (t, x; u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) = 0, We refer the readers to [23] (and the references cited therein) for the case of LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential games. Recall that in [23] , open-loop and closed-loop saddle points were introduced and it was established that the existence of an open-loop saddle point for the problem is equivalent to the solvability of a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short), and the existence of a closed-loop saddle point for the problem is equivalent to the solvability of a (differential) Riccati equation.
In this paper, we will not assume (1.4) so that (1.3) is not necessarily true. Such a Problem (SDG) is usually referred to as an LQ stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game, emphasizing that (1.3) is not assumed. We have two main goals in this paper: Establish a theory for Problem (SDG) parallel to that of [23] (for zero-sum case); and study the difference between the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria and the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria. It turns out that the above-mentioned difference for the non-zero sum case is indicated through the symmetry of the corresponding Riccati equations: One is symmetric and the other is not. On the other hand, we found that the situation in the zero-sum case, which was not discussed in [23] , is totally different: The closed-loop representation of open-loop saddle points coincides with the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop saddle point, when both exist. In particular, for stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem, the closed-loop representation of open-loop optimal controls is the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy ( [22] ).
Mathematically, posing condition (1.4) makes the structure of the problem much simpler, since with such a condition, only one performance index is needed, for which one player is the minimizer and the other player is the maximizer. However, as we know that in the real life, each player should have his/her own cost functional, and even for the totally hostile situation, the objectives of the opponents might not necessarily be exactly the opposite (zero-sum). Therefore, realistically, it is more meaningful to investigate Problem (SDG) without assuming (1.4) . By the way, although we will not discuss such a situation in the current paper, we still would like to point out that sometimes, certain cooperations between the players might result in both players rewarded more.
Static version of nonzero-sum differential games could be regarded as a kind of non-cooperative games for which one can trace back to the work of Nash [19] . For some early works on nonzero-sum differential games, we would like to mention Lukes-Russell [14] , Friedman [7] , and Bensoussan [1] . In the past two decays, due to the appearance of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs, for short), some new and interesting works published; Among them, we would like to mention [8, 9, 6, 4, 21, 10] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will collect some preliminaries. Among other things, we will recall some known results on LQ optimal control problems. In Section 3, we will introduce open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. A characterization of the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria in terms of solvability of two coupled FBSDEs will be presented in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the discussion on the closed-loop Nash equilibria whose existence is characterized by the solvability of two coupled symmetric Riccati equations. In Section 6, we will present two examples showing the difference between open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. In Section 7, closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria will be studied, and comparison between the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria and the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria will be carried out. Finally, we will take a deeper look at the situation for LQ zero-sum games in Section 8.
Preliminaries
Let R n×m be the space of all (n × m) matrices and S n ⊆ R n×n be the set of all (n × n) symmetric matrices. The inner product · , · on R n×m is given by M, N → tr (M ⊤ N ), and the induced norm is given by |M | = tr (M ⊤ M ). We denote by R(M ) the range of a matrix M , and for M, N ∈ S n we use the notation M N (respectively, M > N ) to indicate that M − N is positive semi-definite (respectively, positive definite). Recall that any M ∈ R n×m admits a unique (Moore-Penrose) pseudo-inverse M † ∈ R m×n having the following properties ( [20] ):
Further, we introduce the following spaces of random variables and stochastic processes:
We now recall some results on stochastic LQ optimal control problems. Consider the state equation
The cost functional takes the following form:
We adopt the following assumptions.
(S1) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:
(S2) The weighting coefficients in the cost functional satisfy the following:
Note that under (S1), for any (t,
, the state equation (2.1) admits a unique strong solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x, u(·)). Further, if (S2) is also assumed, then the cost functional (2.2) is well-defined for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n and u(·) ∈ U[t, T ]. Therefore, the following problem is meaningful.
Problem (SLQ). For any given initial pair
J(t, x; u(·)).
is called an open-loop optimal control of Problem (SLQ) for (t, x); the correspondingX(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x,ū(·)) is called an open-loop optimal state process and (X(·),ū(·)) is called an open-loop optimal pair. 
The following result is concerned with open-loop optimal controls of Problem (SLQ) for a given initial pair, whose proof can be found in [23] (see also [22] ).
is an open-loop optimal pair of Problem (SLQ) if and only if the following hold:
(i) The stationarity condition holds:
where (Ȳ (·),Z(·)) is the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
(ii) The map u(·) → J(t, 0; u(·)) is convex.
Next, for any given
For any x ∈ R n , let us consider the following equation:
which admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x, Θ(·), v(·)), depending on Θ(·) and v(·). The above is called a closed-loop system of the original state equation (2.1) under closed-loop strategy (Θ(·), v(·)). We point out that (Θ(·), v(·)) is independent of the initial state x. With the above corresponding solution X(·), we define
We now recall the following definition.
We emphasize that the pair (Θ(·),v(·)) is required to be independent of the initial state x ∈ R n . It is interesting that the following equivalent theorem holds.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) For any x ∈ R n and v(·) ∈ U[t, T ],
whereX(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ(·),v(·)) and X(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ(·), v(·)).
(iii) For any x ∈ R n and u(·) ∈ U[t, T ],
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) follows by taking Θ(·) =Θ(·) in (2.5).
For the implication (ii) ⇒ (iii), take any u(·) ∈ U[t, T ] and let X(·) = X(· ; t, x, u(·)). Then
which proves (iii).
This completes the proof.
From the above result, we see that if (Θ(·),v(·)) is a closed-loop optimal strategy of Problem (SLQ) on [t, T ], then for any fixed initial state x ∈ R n , withX(·) denoting the state process corresponding to (t, x) and (Θ(·),v(·)), (2.6) implies that the outcomē
is an open-loop optimal control of Problem (SLQ) for (t, x). Therefore, for Problem (SLQ), the existence of closed-loop strategies on [t, T ] implies the existence of open-loop optimal controls for initial pair (t, x) for any x ∈ R n . We point out that the situation will be different for two-person differential games. Details will be carried out later.
For closed-loop optimal strategies, we have the following characterization ( [23, 22] ). 
and the adapted solution (η(·), ζ(·)) to the BSDE
In this case, any closed-loop optimal strategy (Θ(·),v(·)) of Problem (SLQ) admits the following representation:
Further, the value function is given by
Stochastic Differential Games
We return to our Problem (SDG). Recall the sets
. For notational simplicity, we let m = m 1 + m 2 and denote
Naturally, we identify
With such notations, the state equation becomes
and the cost functionals become (i = 1, 2)
Now let us introduce the following standard assumptions:
(G1) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:
(G2) The weighting coefficients in the cost functionals satisfy the following: For i = 1, 2,
Moreover, the following estimate holds:
For any initial pair (t,
, consider the following system:
Under (G1), the above admits a unique solution
then the above (3.3) coincides with the original state equation (1.1). We call (Θ i (·), v i (·)) a closed-loop strategy of Player i, and call (3.3) the closed-loop system of the original system under closed-loop strategies (Θ 1 (·), v 1 (·)) and (Θ 2 (·), v 2 (·)) of Players 1 and 2. Also, we call u(·)
⊤ with u i (·) defined by (3.4) the outcome of the closed-loop strategy (Θ(·), v(·)). With the solution X(·) to (3.3), we denote (3.5)
Similarly, one can define
. We now introduce the following definition.
, the following hold:
Note that in both (3.6) and (3.7),
. Thus, X(·) appeared in (3.6) and (3.7) are different in general. We emphasize that the closed-loop Nash equilibrium (Θ *
is independent of the initial state x. The following result provides some equivalent definitions of closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
Then the following are equivalent:
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.4.
If we denote
Likewise, one might not have the following either:
Hence, comparing this with (3.2), we see that the outcome (ū 1 (·),ū 2 (·)) of the closed-loop Nash equilibrium
On the other hand, if (Θ *
with cost functionals (3.14)
Then by (ii) of Proposition 3.3, (v
Open-Loop Nash Equilibria and FBSDEs
In this section, we discuss the open-loop Nash equilibria for Problem (SDG) in terms of FBSDEs. The main result of this section can be stated as follows.
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x) if and only if the following two conditions hold:
satisfies the following stationarity condition:
(ii) For i = 1, 2, the following convexity condition holds:
where X i (·) is the solution to the following FSDE:
Or, equivalently, the map
) be the adapted solution to FBSDE (4.1) with i = 1. For any u 1 (·) ∈ U 1 [t, T ] and ε ∈ R, let X ε (·) be the solution to the following perturbed state equation on [t, T ]:
Then denoting X 1 (·) the solution of (4.4) with i = 1, we have X ε (·) = X * (·) + εX 1 (·) and
On the other hand, applying Itô's formula to s → Y * 1 (s), X 1 (s) , we obtain
Hence,
It follows that
if and only if (4.3) holds for i = 1, and
Similarly,
if and only if (4.3) holds for i = 2, and
Combining (4.5)-(4.6), we obtain (4.2).
Note that (4.1) for i = 1, 2 are two coupled FBSDEs, and these two FBSDEs are coupled through the relation (4.2). In fact, from (4.2), we see that
Thus, say, in the case that the coefficient matrix of u * is invertible, one has
Plugging the above into (4.1), we see the coupling between the two coupled FBSDEs (with i = 1, 2).
To conclude this section, let us write FBSDE (4.1) and stationarity condition (4.2) more compactly. For this, we introduce the following:
FT (Ω; R 2n ).
Further, let
Clearly, one has
With the above notation, FBSDE (4.1) can be written as (suppressing s and dropping * )
and the stationarity condition (4.2) can be written as
Keep in mind that (4.7) is a coupled FBSDE with the coupling given through (4.8).
Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria and Riccati Equations
We now look at closed-loop Nash equilibria for Problem (SDG). Again, for simplicity of notation, we will suppress the time variable s as long as no confusion arises. First, we present the following result which is a consequence of Theorem 4.1.
and let X(·) be the solution to the R n×n -valued SDE
X(t) = I.
Proof. Let us consider state equation (3.13) with the cost functionals defined by (3.14). Denoting
by an argument similar to (3.5), we have:
We know by (ii) of Proposition 3.
⊤ is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the problem with the state equation (3.13) and with the cost functionals J i (t, x; v(·)) for any initial pair (t, x). Thus, according to Theorem 4.1, we have for i = 1, 2,
with X * (·) being the solution to the closed-loop system:
and (Y * i (·), Z * i (·)) being the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
Since (Θ * (·), v * (·)) is independent of x and (5.4)-(5.6) hold for all x ∈ R n , by subtracting solutions corresponding to x and 0, the latter from the former, we see that for any x ∈ R n , the adapted solution
The desired result then follows easily.
Now we are ready to present the main result of this section, which characterizes the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG).
satisfies the following two conditions:
(ii) For i = 1, 2, the adapted solution (η i (·), ζ i (·)) to the BSDE (5.10)
Proof. We first prove the necessity. Suppose that (Θ
and Y i (·) (i = 1, 2) be the solutions of (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. Consider the following linear ordinary differential equation (ODE, for short) which is equivalent to (5.7):
Such an equation admits a unique solution P i (·) ∈ C([t, T ]; S n ). By Itô's formula, we have
Comparing the above with (5.2), by the uniqueness of adapted solutions to BSDEs, one has
From (5.1), we see that the process X(·) is invertible almost surely. Then, the above together with (5.3) leads to (5.9). Now let X * (·) be the solution to (5.5), and for i = 1, 2, let (Y * i (·), Z * i (·)) be the adapted solution to (5.6). Define
Then η i (T ) = g i , and
Thus, (η i , ζ i ) is the adapted solution to BSDE (5.10). Next, from the proof of Proposition 5.1 we know that (5.4) holds. Thus (noting (5.9) and (5.13)),
which is (5.11). The proof of (5.8) will be included in the proof of sufficiency.
To prove the sufficiency, we take any
2 (·)) be the state process corresponding to (t, x) and (Θ *
On the other hand, we have
Combining the above two equations, together with equation (5.12) (which is equivalent to (5.7)) and conditions (5.9) and (5.11), one obtains
It follows that for any
if and only if R
Similarly, for any v 2 (·) ∈ U 2 [t, T ],
This proves the sufficiency, as well as the necessity of (5.8).
Note that condition (5.9) is equivalent to the following:
Therefore, (5.14)
, provided the involved inverse (which is an R m×m -valued function) exists. By plugging such a Θ * (·) into (5.7), we see that the equations for P 1 (·) and P 2 (·) are coupled, symmetric, and of Riccati type. Now, let us try to rewrite the Riccati equation in a more compact form. Note that (recalling the notation we introduced in the previous section)
Hence, in the case that
exists and is bounded, we have
which is the same as (5.14). On the other hand, (5.7) can be written as
Consequently, one sees that the following holds:
and Θ * is given by (5.15). Clearly, (5.16) is symmetric.
Two Examples
From the previous sections, we see that the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the solvability of a coupled system of two FBSDEs, together with the convexity condition for the cost functionals (see (4.3)); and that the existence of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the solvability of a coupled system of two symmetric Riccati equations satisfying certain type of non-negativity condition (see (5.8) 
and cost functionals
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the problem for the initial pair (t, x). Indeed, it is clear that for any 
Likewise,
F (t, 1; R). This establishes the claim.
However, this problem does not admit a closed-loop Nash equilibrium. We now show this by contradiction.
) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Consider the corresponding ODEs in Theorem 5.2, which now become
The corresponding constraints read (6.2) P 1 , P 2 0,
Since P 1 (·) and P 2 (·) satisfy the same ODE (6.1), we have P 1 (·) = P 2 (·). Then (6.2) implies P 1 (·) = 0, which contradicts the terminal condition P 1 (1) = 1.
The following example shows that Problem (SDG) may have only closed-loop Nash equilibria.
Example 6.2. Consider the following Problem (SDG) with one-dimensional state equation
We claim that the problem admits a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of form (Θ 1 (·), 0; Θ 2 (·), 0). In fact, by Theorem 5.2, we need to solve the following Riccati equations for P 1 (·) and P 2 (·): 
A straightforward calculation leads to
Therefore, ((2 − s) −1 , 0; 0, 0) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the problem.
Next, we claim that the problem does not have open-loop Nash equilibria. Indeed, suppose (u *
) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for some initial pair (t, x). Then u * 2 (·) is an open-loop optimal control of the following Problem (SLQ) with state equation
and cost functional
F (t, 1; R), the corresponding solution to (6.5) is given by
Let ε > 0 be undetermined. Substituting (6.7) into (6.6) and using the inequality (a + b)
Now, by taking u 2 (s) = λ, λ ∈ R, we have
Choosing ε > 0 small enough so that 2ε + (ε − 1)(1 − t) < 0 and then letting λ → ∞, we see that
which contradicts the fact that u * 2 (·) is an open-loop optimal control of the associated LQ problem.
Closed-Loop Representation of Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
Inspired by the decoupling technique introduced in [15, 16, 24, 25] , we now look at the solvability of FBSDE (4.1)-(4.2). Recall that with the notation introduced in Section 4, (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent to (4.7) and (4.8), respectively. To solve FBSDE (4.7)-(4.8), let (η η η(·), ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ(·)) be the adapted solution to the following BSDE for some undetermined α :
Let (X(·), Y(·), Z(·)) be an adapted solution to FBSDE (4.7). Suppose the following holds:
Hence, one should have
Then the stationarity condition (4.8) becomes
Note that
This is an R m×m -valued function which is not symmetric in general, even Π 1 and Π 2 are symmetric. We now assume that the above is invertible. Then one has
Now, let Π(·) be the solution to the following Riccati equation:
Then the above leads to the BSDE for (η η η(·), ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ(·)) of the following form:
Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 7.1. Let (G1)-(G2) hold and let t ∈ [0, T ) be given. Suppose that the convexity condition (4.3) holds for i = 1, 2, and that the Riccati equation (7.4) admits a solution Π(·). Let (η η η(·), ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ(·)) be the adapted solution to BSDE (7.5) and let X(·) be the solution to the following FSDE with an arbitrary initial state x:
Then the process u(·) defined by (7.3 ) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x).
Proof. From the above procedure, we see that with u(·) defined by (7. 3), the triple (X(·), Y(·), Z(·)) defined through FSDE (7.6), (7.1) and (7.2) , is an adapted solution to FBSDE (4.7), and that the stationarity condition (4.8) holds. Hence, together with the convexity condition (4.3), making use of Theorem 4.1, we see that u(·) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x).
Under the assumptions of Theorem 7.1, Problem (SDG) admits an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state x, and the open-loop Nash equilibria take the following form: 
T ] such that for any initial state x ∈ R n , the process
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x), where X(·) is the solution to the following closed-loop system:
Comparing Definitions 3.2 and 7.2, it is natural to ask whether the closed-loop representation of openloop Nash equilibria is the outcome of some closed-loop Nash equilibrium. The following example shows that this is not the case in general.
Example 7.3. Consider the following state equation:
with cost functionals
For this case, we have
Clearly, the convexity condition (4.3) holds for i = 1, 2. In this example, the Riccati equation (7.4) can be written componentwise as follows:
It is easy to see that
2e T −s − 1 are solutions to (7.10) and (7.11), respectively. Note that in this case the adapted solution (η η η(·), ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ(·)) to BSDE (7.5) is (0, 0). Then by Theorem 7.1, the open-loop Nash equilibria of this Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] admit a closed-loop representation given by
Next we verify that the problem admits a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of form (Θ 1 (·), 0; Θ 2 (·), 0). In light of Theorem 5.2, we need to solve the following Riccati equations for P 1 (·) and P 2 (·):
and (7.14)
Noting the third equations in (7.13) and (7.14), we can further write (7.13)-(7.14) as follows:
Now it is easily seen that
Comparing ( (
and the adapted solution (η η η(·), ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ(·)) to the BSDE on [t, T ]
Proof. For any x ∈ R n , let X(·), Π(·), and (η η η(·), ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ(·)) be the solutions to (7.9), (7.18) , and (7.20), respectively. Let u(·) be defined by (7.8) and set
Then Y(T ) = GI n X(T ) + g, and
This shows that (X(·), Y(·), Z(·), u(·)) satisfies the FBSDE (4.7). According to Theorem 4.1, the process u(·) defined by (7.8 ) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for (t, x) if and only if (i) holds and
Since the initial state x is arbitrary and
is independent of x, the above leads to (7.19 ) and (7.21).
Let us write (7.18)-(7.21) componentwise as follows: For i = 1, 2,
Noting the relation (7.23), one sees the equations for Π 1 (·) and Π 2 (·) are coupled and none of them is symmetric. Consequently, Π 1 (·) and Π 2 (·) are not symmetric in general. Whereas the Riccati equations (5.7) for P i (·) (i = 1, 2) are symmetric. This is the main reason that the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria is different from the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria.
Zero-Sum Cases
In the previous section, we have seen that for Problem (SDG), the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria is different from the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. Now we would like to take a look at the situation for LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential games. In this case, Nash equilibria are usually called saddle points. According to (1.4), we have (8.1)
and
and assume the open-loop saddle points of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] admit the closed-loop representation (7.8). The equations (7.22) (i = 1, 2) for Π 1 (·) and Π 2 (·) now become
respectively. Obviously, both Π 1 (·) and −Π 2 (·) satisfy
Thus, Π 1 (·) = −Π 2 (·) ≡ Π(·), and (7.23) becomes 
and in this case,
for some ν(·) ∈ L 2 F (t, T ; R m ). To summarize, we have the following result for LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential games. (ii) The Riccati equation (8.5) admits a solution Π(·) ∈ C([t, T ]; S n ) such that (8.3) holds, and the adapted solution of (8.6) satisfies (8.7).
In the above case, all the closed-loop representations of open-loop saddle points are given by
where θ(·) ∈ L 2 (t, T ; R m×n ) and ν(·) ∈ L 2 F (t, T ; R m ).
Proof. The result can be proved by combining Theorem 7.4 and the previous argument. We leave the details to the interested reader. Now let us recall from [23] the characterization of closed-loop saddle points of LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential games. 
a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
In this case, the closed-loop saddle point (Θ * (·), v * (·)) admits the following representation:
(8.14)
where θ(·) ∈ L 2 (t, T ; R m×n ) and ν(·) ∈ L 
